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A TRIBUTE TO FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY

Special]

P.

Retroactivity of ProceduralRule

In State v. Blake, 6' the specific issue of retroactivity relating to a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure was addressed:
The criteria to be used in deciding the retroactivity of new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure are: (a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards. Thus, a judicial decision in a criminal case is to be
given prospective application only if: (a) It established a new
principle of law; (b) its retroactive application would retard its
operation; and (c) its retroactive application would produce
inequitable results."
IV. CRIMINAL LAW

A.

FirstDegreeMurder

First degree murder was thoroughly discussed in State v. Guthrie." The
focus of that case was the elements of premeditation and deliberation. As a general
statement, Justice Cleckley held that "[a]lthough premeditation and deliberation are
not measured by any particular period of time, there must be some period between
the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing, which indicates the killing
is by prior calculation and design. This means there must be an opportunity for
some reflection on the intention to kill after it is formed."'6" The opinion further
elaborated,
[i]n criminal cases where the State seeks a conviction of first
degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, a trial
court should instruct the jury that murder in the first degree
consists of an intentional, deliberate, and premeditated killing
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which means that the killing is done after a period of time for prior
consideration. The duration of that period cannot be arbitrarily
fixed. The time in which to form a deliberate and premeditated
design varies as the minds and temperaments of people differ and
according to the circumstances in which they may be placed. Any
interval of time between the forming of the intent to kill and the
execution of that intent, which is of sufficient. duration for the
accused to be fully conscious of what he intended, is sufficient to
support a conviction for first degree murder. To the extent that
State v. Schrader is inconsistent with our holding today, it is
expressly overruled. 6 '
B.

Double JeopardyDefense
66
Principles of double jeopardy were set out in State v. Sears:

In order to establish a double jeopardy claim, the defendant must
first present a primafacie claim that double jeopardy principles
have been violated. Once the defendant proffers proof to support
a nonfrivolous claim, the burden shifts to the State to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that double jeopardy principles do
not bar the 67imposition of the prosecution or punishment of the
defendant.
Justice Cleckley then ruled,
[t]he strength of a double jeopardy claim is whether a defendant is
facing multiple punishment for the same course of conduct. To
determine if a particular statutory sanction constitutes punishment
for double jeopardy purposes, courts should consider: (1) whether
the statute serves solely a remedial purpose or serves to punish and
tied the
deter criminal conduct and (2) whether the Legislature
68
sanction to the commission of specific offenses.
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Sears concluded with a ruling on a specific double jeopardy claim. The
opinion held that "[a] prior conviction which is used as the predicate to establish the
crime of wanton endangerment with a firearm also cannot be used to enhance a
defendant's punishment under W. Va. Code, 62-12-13 (1988), the parole statute, in
the absence of explicit legislative authority.' 6 9
C.

Automatism Defense

In State v. Hinkle,7 ° Justice Cleckley addressed the defense of automatism.
The opinion held that
[u]nconsciousness (or automatism) is not part of the insanity
defense, but is a separate claim which may eliminate the
voluntariness of a criminal act. The burden of proof on this issue,
once raised by the defense, remains on the State to prove that the
act was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.'
State v. Hinkle also held that "[a]n instruction on the defense of
unconsciousness is required when there is reasonable evidence that the defendant
was unconscious at the time of the commission of the crime."'7 Finally, Hinkle
held,
[i]f a defendant is sufficiently appraised and aware of a preexisting
condition and previously experienced recurring episodes of loss of
consciousness, e.g., epilepsy, then operating a vehicle or other
potentially destructive implement, with knowledge of the potential
danger, might well amount to reckless disregard for the safety of
others. Therefore, the jury should be charged that even if it
believes there is a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
consciousness at the time of the event, the voluntary operation of
a motor vehicle with knowledge of the potential for loss of
consciousness can constitute reckless behavior.1 3
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Defense of CollateralEstoppel

A few principles of collateral estoppel were discussed in the criminal
setting of State v. Miller.'74 In Miller the defendant unsuccessfully argued that
being found not to have committed assault on a state hospital patient at an
administrative employee grievance hearing collaterally estopped prosecution for
criminal battery based upon the same conduct. Justice Cleckley articulated the
general requirements for collateral estoppel as follows:
Collateral estoppel will bar a claim if four conditions are met: (1)
The issue previously decided is identical to the one presented in
the action in question; (2) there is a final adjudication on the merits
of the prior action; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked was a party or in privity with a party to a prior action; and
(4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. 75
The Miller opinion noted that consideration must be given to the litigating
forums in determining whether collateral estoppel will bar a prosecution:
Relitigation of an issue is not precluded when a new determination
of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or
extensiveness of the procedures followed in two courts. Where the
procedures available in the first court may have been tailored to the
prompt, inexpensive determination of small claims, a compelling
reason exists not to apply collateral estoppel. 76
Justice Cleckley concluded in Miller that "[flor purposes of issue preclusion, issues
and procedures are not identical or similar if the second action involves application
of a different legal standard or substantially different procedural rule, even though
the factual settings of both suits may be the same."'7
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